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Abstract
A group of developing countries within the World Trade Organization, called the G22, 
formed in 2003 to bring attention to important economic concerns of the Global South. 
! is coalition building at the global level is instructive to the literature on social movement 
coalition building and strategies in a transnational context. ! is article examines coalition 
building among nation-states within the context of the WTO. Drawing upon existing trad-
ing blocs, the G22 are able to leverage attention away from the WTO consensus. ! e 
declining signifi cance of the global institution is a result of the breaking of this consensus. 
Keywords
comparative politics, social movement theory, globalization, Global South
! e 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial meeting in Cancun, 
Mexico saw a wide rift between several developed and developing nations 
over specifi c economic proposals. One of the most divisive issues between 
the group of developing nations, which called themselves the Group of 22 
(G22), and the developed nations was that of farm subsidies. Both Japan 
and the US fi scally support their respective agribusinesses but many of the 
G22 countries oppose this practice. Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) 
prohibit many developing countries from adopting these sorts of protec-
tionist policies and cannot provide their agribusinesses with a level playing 
fi eld. ! is article explores how this group of developing nations came to 
coalesce as a distinct group, the G22, with common goals on at least a few 
trade issues on which they diff er with some of the more developed nations.
1) ! is research was supported by National Science Foundation Award # 0413493.
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Despite the various pressures on Japan to embrace the free trade model, 
the country continues to pursue a protectionist agenda. ! is is due to a 
particular equation of forces at work between protectionists and free trade 
partisans in the country. All of the G4 members, Canada, Japan, the United 
States and the European Union, support farm subsidies. ! e particular 
equation of forces in Japan however, has led to a debate about farm subsi-
dies despite the inclination to support free trade. ! is has led to protec-
tionist policies supported by internal as well as external forces.
! e collapse of the talks at the September 2003 meeting of the WTO 
in Cancun illustrated the urgency of the issue and the divisions it causes 
between member countries. A multilateral body charged to monitor eco-
nomic rules adopted by individual nation-states is not a priori a destructive 
ambition, particularly under the globalized economy in which nation-states 
participate. However, the body that fi ts this role most closely among inter-
national institutions is the WTO. Multilateral organizations operate most 
eff ectively when there is a perceived mutual interest among the stakehold-
ers.2 Once this perception is altered within organizations such as the WTO 
in which members elect into the group, the organization can suff er a crisis 
of authenticity.3 Ravaged by obscure procedures and questions of institu-
tional bias, the WTO is in danger of becoming less relevant to developing 
nations if its rules of procedure are not reformed.
I focus on the G22, a network of countries linked by similar policy posi-
tions that self-identify with this label. In the following section, I look at the 
G22 countries individually. By looking at the socio-economic composition 
of this group, we can hope to glean some insight as to the socio-economic 
composition of the G22 relative to other countries in the world. ! is will 
inform our understanding of the coalition as a whole, taking into account 
GDP, geographic location, level of democracy, and population.
In the section labeled, “! e Case: A Recent History,” I examine the polit-
ical equation of forces that produced the G22 as an outcome and why the 
G22 formed at this particular historical juncture. ! is process will illus-
trate how the coalition was formed, shed light on how inequality plays out 
on a global schema, and display coalition-building in international fi nance 
organizations such as the WTO. Social movements, power politics, and 
global inequality are all global processes that will help explain these inter-
national events. In the Protest section I turn to the challenges of social 
2) Immergut 1998.
3) Anheier and Kendall 2003.
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movements and contentious politics. Students of social movements are 
careful not to label visible contentious performances as spontaneous, even 
if they appear as such.4 Similarly, the events that occurred in Cancun were 
not unique or unexpected. In fact, as I discuss later, some groups predicted 
that the Cancun talks would collapse if events happened in the way that 
they did.
I will discuss how the failure at Cancun is unsurprising to some extent, 
because the events leading up to the meeting were progressing in such a 
way that made this outcome highly plausible, if not highly likely. ! e cen-
tral question remains, how did this group of developing nations come to 
identify themselves as a distinct group, the G22, with common goals on at 
least a few trade issues and in contradiction to some of the more developed 
nations? I will then place this phenomenon in some historical context from 
which the events can be analyzed.
Underlying this process is an economic system of inequality in the world. 
Wallerstein and others have discussed the unique role that the United States 
plays as the most powerful actor in a global system of dependency. While 
in such a position, the US enjoys privileges that other countries simply do 
not – privileges that go beyond just economic prosperity. Economic hege-
mony brings with it privileges that go far beyond those of any other coun-
try. ! is includes military operations of a scope that has no equal in the 
modern world. US operations have been undertaken in the upheaval of 
democratic and undemocratic regimes alike. 
! is unique economic position that the United States holds matters here 
because it informs our interpretation of the Cancun meetings. If one sees 
this confl ict as simply a negotiation among equal parties, then one over-
looks quite a lot. One would miss why certain countries take certain posi-
tions and then back away under US pressure. We miss why certain countries 
ally with the US when it seems that their development & diplomatic inter-
ests would lie elsewhere. One misses why this system of power imbalance 
has been occurring for the period of time in which it has taken place within 
an organization that allows opportunities for dissent for Trade Ministers at 
Ministerial meetings.
4) Tilly 2008.
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! e Characteristics of the G22
It is important to consider the characteristics of the G22 member countries, 
comprising the coalitions in this context.5 Country characteristics may lend 
a clue as to how and why the coalition developed. Several social movement 
theorists have discussed how the energy developed in one social movement 
context can “spill over” into adjacent contexts.6 In developing coalitions, 
mutual understanding and trust is important between organizations.7
I later illustrate the main line in globalization and global network theory 
using these internal coalition dynamics in order to draw conclusions for 
social movement scholarship. Data on the Cancun Ministerial conference 
is mainly archival and qualitative and data on the the countries that com-
pose the G22 is mainly descriptive and archival. Position statements on 
behalf of member nations and non-profi t civil society groups, as well as 
press conference transcripts, were freely available on the website of the WTO. 
From this data, I selected the 22 countries represented in the G22 and 
analyzed this information separately. All other qualitative data was collected 
from the websites of media organizations and non-profi t organizations.8
Descriptive statistics are derived from the CIA World Fact Book and the 
Polity IV Database. Table 1 lists the twenty-two countries with their GDP 
in 2002, their Level of Democracy index, and geographic location. In the 
democracy index column, −10 signifi es a strongly autocratic country and 
+10 a strongly democratic country. I chose GDP as a variable to represent 
economic vitality and the Level of Democracy index to represent a quanti-
tative measure of democracy in each nation. I listed each country’s conti-
nent as a measure of geographic location and their estimated population.
G22 nations tend to be more democratic than other nations.9 ! ere is 
also extreme stratifi cation among the countries along economic and 
democracy index variables. ! ere are two clusters within each variable. 
! ree nations, China, India and Brazil, are high outliers in the GDP dis-
tribution while four nations, Pakistan, Egypt, China and Cuba, are low 
5) On coalitions, see Bandy 2004 and Staggenborg 1991.
6) McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994.
7) Anheier and Kendall 2003.
8) Two non-profi t organizations in particular, the ! ird World Network, a civil society 
group based in Malaysia and ActionAid International, based in the UK, documented many 
of the events at Cancun extensively.
9) ! e arithmetic mean for the global level of democracy index is 3.1 and that for the G-22 
is 5.2.
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Nation GDP in Billions of 
Dollars in 2002 
(CIA World Fact 
Book)
Continent Level of 
Democracy in 
2000 in index 
units. (Polity 
IV Dataset)
Population 
(CIA World 
Fact Book)
Argentina 391 South America 8 38,740,807
Brazil 1,340 South America 8 182,032,604
Bolivia 21 South America 9 8,586,443
Chile 151 South America 9 15,665,216
China 5,700 Asia −7 1,286,975,468
Colombia 268 South America 7 41,662,073
Costa Rica 32.3 South America 10 3,896,092
Cuba 25.9 South America −7 11,263,429
Ecuador 41.7 South America 6 13,710,234
Egypt 268 Africa −6 74,718,797
El Salvador 30 South America 7 6,470,379
Guatemala 48 South America 8 13,909,384
India 2,660 Asia 9 1,049,700,118
Mexico 900 North America 8 104,907,991
Pakistan 311 Asia −6 150,694,740
Paraguay 25 South America 7 6,036,900
Peru 132 South America * 28,409,897
Philippines 356 Asia 8 84,619,974
South Africa 432 Africa 9 42,768,678
! ailand 429 Asia 9 64,265,276
Turkey 468 Asia 7 68,109,469
Venezuela 132.8 South America 7 24,654,694
* = Transitional or Provisional Government (end of Alberto Fujimori’s regime).
Table 1 G22 Coalition Member Characteristics
outliers in the democracy index distribution.10 Turning to the population 
variable, although the G22 represent only a handful of countries, they 
make up half of the world’s total population. ! ey also contain nearly two-
10) It might be noted that China and Cuba are special cases since they are among the last 
remaining Communist nations in the world.
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thirds of the world’s farmers and they produce more than one-fi fth of global 
agricultural output.11 ! eir combined GDP is 14.16 trillion dollars – 
slightly less than the combined GDP of the US and Japan.
Judging from the internal assets of this coalition and its structural agri-
cultural leverage,12 the G22 might have fared well in proposing WTO 
policy favorable to agribusinesses in the Global South.
Globalization
! ere is much debate about what exactly globalization is, but for the pur-
poses of this article I will borrow from Held, who defi nes globalization as 
a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization 
of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity 
and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional fl ows and networks of activity, 
interaction, and exercise of power.13
To this I would add that globalization is also an era of increased qualitative 
self-refl ection and acute awareness of this process of ever-increasing global 
interconnectedness. Globalization is composed of both measurable and 
immeasurable changes. ! e debate in this area is beyond proving or dis-
proving the existence of globalization by measuring changes in certain pro-
cesses over time. Pertaining to the G22, one might think of them as a 
movement of global farm workers just as justifi ably, or even moreso, than 
thinking of them as a conventional nation-state trade bloc.
G22 countries, far from among the global rich but also not among the 
most destitute in the world, are the ones taking the initiative to challenge 
the developed countries on these global trade issues on behalf of them-
selves and other developing countries. ! is observation is consistent with 
resource mobilization theory that tells us that there is generally a maximum 
threshold of resources one must have to have the ideological motivation to 
undertake contentious politics; and a minimum threshold of resources to 
have the luxury of surpassing your own needs and undertaking them as 
part of an agenda.14 In a global economic schema, especially popular among 
11) Agence France Presse, 10 Oct 2003a.
12) See Schwartz 1976.
13) Held et al. 2002, italics in original.
14) ! ough challenged in recent years, this analytical category can still hold some  explanatory 
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World Systems theorists, G22 countries are generally thought of as being 
located in the semi-periphery. G22 countries, in a sense, operate as a bloc 
of many of the semi-periphery countries of the world.
In analyzing an international political situation such as this one, one 
cannot ignore the role of the nation-state. Most international relations 
scholarship focuses on nation-states as central actors and even includes 
transnational processes. But oftentimes social movements concepts, ana-
lytical categories and theories, and within the study of social behavior more 
generally, are developed within one nation-state context, and nearly always 
in a developed, Western society. ! ey explicitly or implicitly assume that 
existing social movement concepts will carry over into other societies and 
that social movements share similar boundaries as nation-states.15 ! is is 
hardly to say that the nation state is not relevant. Alongside existing ana-
lytical tools that assume the nation-state as the major factor in both domes-
tic and international aff airs, we may add ones that factor in trans- and 
supra- national and territorial forces. As Sharpf, Gilpin and others argue, 
the nation-state continues to be the major actor in both domestic and 
international aff airs and we must continue to consider these political pro-
cesses.16 But the literature on global social movements has made inroads, 
without which a distorted view of supranational processes would continue 
without being addressed.
However, skeptics, including rational choice analysts, might argue that 
Brazil, for instance, was acting in a manner consistent with its own eco-
nomic interest in Cancun. Trade ministers and President Lula worked hard 
to gather more members into the G22 in the weeks and days prior to the 
Cancun meeting because it benefi ts Brazil to do so. ! is is just another case 
of a plurilateral agreement. Certainly, MERCOSUR (Southern Common 
Market), the political and economic agricultural trade bloc of the South-
ern Cone, provides incentives for additional partnerships and a structure 
on which to build the new G22 coalition. However, forming the sort of 
social and economic coalition that the G22 was able to build, and on the 
scale in which it did so, is unprecedented as a repertoire of contention 
within international governmental organizations (IGO) politics along the 
sway, particularly when observing for which actor the political opportunity is for. See 
Ramos 2008.
15) See Alger 1997 for a discussion of this last point.
16) Sharpf 2002; Gilpin 2002.
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semi-periphery and core nation boundaries.17 It is, to borrow from Richard 
Falk, globalization from below reacting to “globalization from above”.18 It 
has led to a subsequent turn to the Left in Latin America, with a rally of 
electoral victories by Left parties aff ecting most of the region.
Robert Gilpin argues that “many of the problems alleged to be the result 
of economic globalization are really the consequence of unfortunate national 
policies and government decisions.”19 He off ers an example of supposedly 
incompetent Brazilian development policies that destroyed thousands of 
acres of woodland and rainforest. But what Gilpin describes as “unfortu-
nate” nation-state policies has been shown not to be simply created by the 
implied ignorance or misguidance of nation-state politicians. Rather, these 
decisions are direct or indirect results of the policies of supranational fi nan-
cial lending institutions on which these nation-states depend. In the case 
of Brazil, these policies were the result of SAPs that came along with Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. IMF program benefi ts and market 
signals explain nation-state development policies far better than supposed 
government ineptitude. Because domestic economic policy is aff ected by 
global processes as well as domestic ones, thinking about transnational 
economic policies requires a diff erent set of tools to understand these 
trends.20 
Alger discusses how global alliances across nation-states, such as the G22, 
make global governance, such as the WTO, easier.21 It also makes sense 
that if global governance is made easier, that coordinated action in trans-
national organizations is not only possible, but also easier. Stemming from 
Alger, global alliances make it not only easier to govern the WTO, but it 
may be easier to create alliances such as the G22. In more general terms, 
not only is global governance easier, but it may be easier to create blocs, 
alliances, and coalitions. It may also be the case that these alliances are 
17) For more on the growth of the transnational social movements sector, see Smith 2008 
p. 122.
18) Falk 1999. ! is is opposed to the term ‘anti-globalization’, as some have called this and 
related movements.
19) Gilpin 2002.
20) Not without their critics, World Systems ! eories use the world as a unit of analysis, 
applying the idea outlined here to contextualize the nation-state as an explanatory unit for 
explaining inequality. See Moncada and Blau 2005; Moncada and Blau 2006 for other 
ways in which to think about the “role of social scientists” with regards to the study of 
global processes such as human rights.
21) Alger 1997.
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also easier to govern. Just increases in democracy and human rights within 
countries can spur even more democratic and human rights reforms within 
those countries, the same strategy may be adopted at the global level.22
Falk suggests that a “globalization from below” take place as a two-pronged 
strategy of resistance against “globalization from above.” One prong is local 
grassroots resistance, which themselves are aware of global processes. ! e 
second is transnational linkages among and between these movements.23 
“! ink globally, act locally” has been the mantra of this grassroots move-
ment (as well as the title of many articles and books studying the move-
ment). Falk argues that the decisions that get made in global processes 
eff ect real people’s lives at the local level.24 ! ose people see real, direct 
changes happening in their lives and try to stop the changes from harming 
them. Much of the blame for these changes has been placed on the broad 
shoulders of international fi nance organizations. Many of these protests 
manifest into civil society groups or actions by the nation-states, as was the 
case for the G22. 
! e Case: A Recent History
! e Singapore issues (investment, competition, transparency in govern-
ment procurement and trade facilitation) by and large created the largest 
rift between the developed and developing nations.
At the Singapore WTO Ministerial (1996), Ministers agreed to form a working group 
to study the relationship between trade and investment. It was explicitly stated that 
there was no commitment to negotiate an agreement. For the next fi ve years (1997–
2001) the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment 
held several discussions. Major developed countries pressed very hard to have the 
working group transformed into a negotiating group that would negotiate an invest-
ment agreement in the WTO. However, the majority of developing countries were 
extremely reluctant to agree to this. Some of these countries were strongly opposed. 
! e reasons included: the inappropriateness of an investment regime in a trade organ-
isation; the resulting loss of developing countries policy autonomy over investment 
policy would damage development options; the lack of understanding of the issues 
and their implications for development; harmful eff ects of new obligations; diversion 
of time and human resources from other vital work in the WTO. ! ey wanted the 
22) See Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004 for this eff ect at the nation-state level within a human 
rights context.
23) Falk 1999.
24) Falk 1999.
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study process to continue, and were adamant that negotiations for an agreement 
should not start.25 
At the Singapore meeting, a decision was forced. It was made in back room 
meetings. ! e developing nations did not like this and wished it to not 
happen again. At the next meeting in Seattle, WA in 1999, again agree-
ments made in undemocratic secret backroom deals caused the talks to 
collapse. At the subsequent meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001, the meeting 
nearly collapsed because developed nations tried to force through an agree-
ment at the last minute. Developed nations warned that if the agreement 
was not approved it would cause an international economic collapse. ! rough 
tactics of manipulation, the agreement was made and the developed coun-
tries won. Although developing nations agreed to this, they warned the 
group not to resort to this again for they would not accept it next time. At 
the WTO meeting in Cancun, Mexico in 2003, a similar eff ort to force 
talks on an agreement caused the talks to fall through. ! e bloc of 22 formed 
just weeks before the Cancun Ministerial conference, after being so enraged 
by the proposed ministerial text. ! ey were maddened after lobbying for 
the Chair to incorporate some proposed language that they had intro-
duced and not having any of their proposals incorporated. Instead the 
Chair accepted almost all of the language proposed by the United States. 
! is additional gesture, combined with the wholesale omission of their 
contribution, alienated G22 countries from the process. 
! e WTO in Context: Global Financial Institutions
! e global economic system, working to open markets under a system of 
free trade, does not apply its rules equally. It is a selective free trade system 
that enriches already enriched developed nations. It has developed to this 
stage from a series of previous stages of economic and power imbalances. 
In the 18th century, the colonial powers – United Kingdom, Germany, 
Spain, and France – seized power and resources directly from their colo-
nies. ! ere was no question or ambiguity in the laws or policies about who 
was in charge. After a series of revolutions, the colonial powers were forced 
to change tactics and gave their colonies more direct autonomy. However, 
for a variety of reasons, the colonized were largely dependent on their for-
mer colonial powers for their economic stability. ! e United States later 
became a colonial power from their previous state as a colony. After World 
25) Khor 2003.
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War II, a more formal, bureaucratized and global version of this power 
structure emerged in the form of the United Nations (UN), the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – the fi rst for global 
peace and security, the second for the stability of the global economy, and 
the third to rebuild Europe, but later to provide bail-out loans to countries 
in need. Each of these global institutions was set up with most of the power 
lying with the old powers. ! e UN was set up to be run by a security coun-
cil with fi ve countries holding permanent veto power: China, France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. ! e World 
Bank is run by stockholders. ! e distribution of stock is roughly propor-
tional to the percentage of state’s GDP to the aggregate. In this system, 
those who hold the most amount of stock in the Bank, have the most 
policy infl uence. Here the US holds 17% of the stock, which is considered 
an eff ective veto. ! e IMF is run by the same system as the World Bank 
with the US holding policy-making power.
Lastly, the WTO has a structure unique from the other bodies, but it 
tends to operate similarly. ! e WTO is a democratic organization in the 
purest sense – each member country – all 146 of them – has equal voting 
power as well as de facto veto power: a type of consensus model where 
countries do not have to agree if they do not want to. It is the most ideal 
system for a body that portends to represent the economic interests of 
all of the countries in the world. ! ere are many examples of such consen-
sus-based systems working well in all sorts of organizations, within corpo-
rate boards; non-profi t organizations; and city councils across the world. 
! ere are also many examples of such systems failing terribly. ! e diff erence 
between those that fail and those that succeed is whether or not the indi-
vidual actors within the organization put the interest of the organization 
before their own personal interest. When this happens, the organization 
succeeds. When it does not, the organization fl ounders. Although the con-
sensus model is the most egalitarian, fair, and effi  cient decision-making 
process, it does not work when individual actors are not honest, have hid-
den agendas, and put their needs before the needs of the organization.26 
Such is the case with the WTO.
Unfair Rules
G4 nations created this modern system decades ago and are in a good posi-
tion to exploit these rules to their advantage. ! ey know the purposes it is 
26) For more on consensus, see Esparza and Winn 2003; cf. Polletta 2002.
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supposed to serve and they are cognizant of and deliberate with their 
actions within the organization. Other nations were invited to join only 
after they fi nished making the rules. It bears some similarity to the card 
game ‘Mao’ that was made popular in the United States among youth dur-
ing the 1990’s. ! e manner in which one learns the rules of the game is to 
unknowingly break the rules and be punished. New players do poorly for 
a while, until they are able to determine the rules through trial and error. 
! en, actors can exploit the rules to their own advantage by preying on 
other newcomers. ! e strategy is viciously self-interested and manipula-
tive. Whereas G4 powers once had direct overt control of colonies, they 
now employ covert exploitation of developing nations through dysfunc-
tional global institutions. Cancun highlights a movement trying to create 
a crisis of rhetoric by using the rules of the WTO against its makers.
Real and changing power diff erences over time explain why it took so 
long for the G22 nations to form a bloc and achieve their accomplishments. 
During the Cold War, countries aligned either with the Soviet Union or 
with the United States, with few countries that were on-aligned. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union came the collapse of this paradigm. It took 
some time for developing countries to adjust to the new geo-political era 
and develop concrete strategies. In the WTO this was a gradual process. 
Developing countries began to realize their agency through the collective 
power of their sheer number when they disrupted the Seattle ministerial 
meeting in 1999 by simply not cooperating. Unfortunately, they were merely 
discovering this power and did not have concrete alternate proposals to 
off er. At Doha in November of 2001, they learned exactly how the process 
worked – the hard way – by experiencing back-room deals made exclu-
sively by developed nations and their WTO allies and the power that 
developed nations had in writing proposals with no alternative concrete 
solutions on the table. When the developed nations threatened that no 
agreement would mean a certain global economic downturn, the lesson 
learned was that with no counter-proposals, there are no alternatives except 
a failed Ministerial conference. After Doha, the WTO promised that a 
strong development agenda would be developed but this never came to 
fruition. In Cancun, an alternative structure to the global economy was 
been presented and progress was being made on that agenda. ! e proposal 
was not passed, or even accepted by the Chair, but its very existence changed 
the balance of power.27
27) Since then, social movement organizations have taken these alternative proposals to the 
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After learning the process, the rules to the global fi nancial game, and 
going through it a number of times, some member nations coalesced around 
their common experience. G4 countries were not playing by the same rules. 
It became evident that the G4 countries were acting under the guise of 
fairness and equity, but were actually just trying to get developing coun-
tries to agree to trade deals that were largely benefi ting developed coun-
tries. ! is realization brought a change in strategy. Whereas G22 countries 
once negotiated and ceded important agenda in an act of goodwill for future 
gain, they later moved towards a more positional negotiating strategy. ! is 
type of shift created the turmoil necessary to open an opportunity for change.
! e manner by which global inequality is being negotiated is beginning 
to be challenged in promising ways. Traditionally, the G4 countries have 
been the one to set the agenda, but the repercussions of the collapse of 
both the Seattle and Cancun talks have been felt well beyond the institu-
tion. ! is shifting balance of power within the WTO refl ects a more global 
phenomenon refl ecting grander changes in the geo-political climate. Just 
as the colonies rose up against their colonizers when they failed to believe 
the rhetoric of colonialism, developing nations are questioning the G4 on 
the current rhetoric of global economic capitalism. ! e modern rhetoric 
has two contradictory components. Public statements that refl ect an interest 
in raising the standard of living for the global poor are juxtaposed against 
actions that that directly oppose such an agenda.
! e facilitating body for the global economy has been one outcome of 
increasing globalization, but the challenges of governing such an institu-
tion is complicated by the coinciding trend of decreasing nation-state sov-
ereignty. If more nation-states had more control over the WTO, it would 
not be quite as driven by free trade and economics. ! is democracy defi cit 
is a result of the rising infl uence of private interests. Nation-states cannot 
eff ectively govern an institution that controls the global economy when 
private power can be wielded to aff ect outcomes in favor of private interest. 
! ere is a general crisis in rhetoric and with the loss of trust in negotia-
tions; there is also a specifi c crisis of legitimacy within the WTO. ! ere is 
no perceived incentive for G4 nations to cede to items in the G22 propos-
als, from the perspective of the G4. An incentive to move towards alterna-
tives must be created, with the involvement of the G4 if possible, and 
without them if necessary.
civil society sector who have adopted it into a series of World Social Forums and the 
“Another World is Possible”.
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! e Question of Economic Inequality
Even while not negotiating in good faith, the G4 still accused the G22 of 
dishonest negotiation strategies. US Trade Minister Robert Zoellick claimed 
in a press conference after the Cancun meeting that the meeting would 
have gone more smoothly had certain countries not waited until the last 
minute to reveal their true positions. But it simply is not true that develop-
ing nations behaved this way. According to ActionAid, in the months 
before the Cancun meeting more than 100 developing WTO nations 
made public statements opposing negotiation on investment and competi-
tion policy. After the fi rst draft of the Derbez text (the primary WTO 
Cancun ministerial trade document), over 70 of those countries reaffi  rmed 
that position. Still the second draft of the Derbez text did not refl ect this 
reality.28
If member nations begin to negotiate in good faith, it is possible that the 
WTO can become a functioning body again. But before we can reach such 
a state, the member nations need to be compelled to act in this manner. 
Unless member nations agree to act in good faith, the organization will not 
be successful. For the Global South, no WTO may be better than a WTO 
that serves only the interests of the G4 nations.
Capital Investments
Since capital investments have become so crucial to modern development 
strategies for developing countries, the question is no longer, ‘How do we 
expand the circle of players who have a seat at the table?’ ! e question now 
becomes, ‘How does the Global South get access to the capital necessary to 
develop and command a voice in the global market?’ Although democrati-
cally elected nation-state governments still hold much global infl uence, 
power has drifted away from the nation-state model and towards a private 
capital model.
If G22 countries pursue an alternative model for globalization, G4 
countries will be tempted to look away from the WTO as a place to focus 
their energy and instead move towards bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments that benefi t them more directly and immediately. ! e extent to 
which this has occurred with increasing frequency is a sign of the declining 
vitality of the WTO.
28) Action Aid 2003.
14
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol4/iss2/9
DOI: 101163/187219109X447494
240 L. E. Esparza / Societies Without Borders 4 (2009) 226–246
Bilateralism however, undermines the founding principles of the WTO 
that the lowest tariff  available needs to be available to all nations. Bilateral-
ism creates power groups that can then come into the WTO as blocs and 
work in the interest of the nation-state(s) on which the countries in the 
bloc are dependent upon. Bilateralism is also a strategy used to break up 
coalitions like the G22 and is one that has already been used to do just 
that. By off ering only a few countries in the bloc a mutually benefi cial 
negotiation undermines any commitment that those countries made to 
the G22, and the power and eff ectiveness of the G22 is diminished consid-
erably. Even just the threat of bilateralism can have the intended eff ect. But 
no nation or regional coalition of nations can eff ectively deal with the unique 
global problems that all countries face: international security, environmen-
tal sustainability, disease control, and the global economy. ! ese problems 
transcend national boundaries. Functioning global institutions rather than 
regional coalitions off er the best means to address common goals and deal 
with common threats and challenges.
After the Cancun Meeting
! e Fall of the G22
! e G22 began meeting just prior to the Cancun conference to discuss 
their coordinated actions as a distinct group within the WTO. ! ey did 
this in response to being essentially ignored by the Chair when requesting 
that the Derbez text be revised to refl ect the interests of most of the nations 
at the meeting. After the events unfolded at Cancun with no agreement on 
the text, the G22 met in Argentina to discuss the future of the group. But 
their plans were complicated by US pressure to break up the group. On 
October 9, 2003, reportedly “under pressure from the United States,” Costa 
Rica, Colombia, Peru and El Salvador announced their withdrawal from 
the G22.29 Guatemala had also pulled out and many did not send minis-
ters even though it was billed as a ministerial meeting.30 Only 15 countries 
actually sent a delegate.31 Others, including Bolivia and Paraguay, “have 
expressed doubts” about remaining in the G22 after the US “implied that 
those who form part of the bloc will not be considered for future bilateral 
29) ! e Xinhua News Agency, 11 Oct 2003.
30) Agence France Presse, 10 Oct 2003a.
31) Agence France Presse, 10 Oct 2003b.
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trade negotiations.”32 ! e same article also reported that Mexico and Chile 
might decide to pull out and that on 10 October 2003, only a dozen of the 
G22 signed a document affi  rming their belief in a “multilateral system of 
commerce . . . on a just and stable basis.” Colombian President Álvaro Uribe 
has expressed that he does not want to be a part of an “anti-US coalition.” 
Peru left by claiming that their understanding was that the G22 was not 
supposed to last after the Cancun meeting. ! e group also faces a name 
crisis. Argentine foreign minister Rafael Bielsa said the meeting “wasn’t a 
meeting of the G-22, or the G-X, or whatever you want to call it, but of 
countries that have a common vision on agricultural negotiations.”33 Because 
of the fl uctuations in membership, Bielsa later called the group “G-fl ux.” 
Ecuador also pulled out of the group.34 According to that same news 
source, “! e US made it a policy aim to break up the group and after 
applying intense pressure achieved the withdrawal of six Latin American 
countries.” Costa Rica and Guatemala “bowed to the warning that they might 
be left out of the US-Central America free-trade agreement (CAFTA).”35 
Colombia has left probably due to their dependency on the US aid from 
Plan Colombia for fi ghting their civil war. One of the main problems that 
coalitions face within contentious politics is that most members tend to 
be issue-based and narrowly focused while the core group struggles to 
keep members in the coalition during intense outside pressure to dissolve 
the group.
Nevertheless, many observers expected the G22 to be a short-lived coali-
tion right from the start.36 Many of the media representations of the talks 
blame the collapse of the meeting on the G22, claiming that the group 
“torpedoed” and “stymied” the WTO talks. ! e Moroccan representative 
to the United Nations General Assembly Mohamed Bennouna, speaking 
on behalf of the larger Group of 77 developing countries and China, told 
the General Assembly that the results of the Cancun meeting proves that 
members should “redouble their eff orts to achieve results satisfactory to 
the developing nations.”37 Many countries favor the G22 agenda over 
the alternative agenda because it is more promising to achieving develop-
ment goals heralded in the UN and elsewhere. Eveline Herfkens of the UN 
32) OneWorld, 22 Sept 2003.
33) Agence France Presse, 10 Oct 2003a.
34) Asia Intelligence Limited, 14 Oct 2003.
35) Asia Intelligence Limited, 14 Oct 2003.
36) OneWorld, 22 Sept 2003.
37) United Nations, 6 Oct 2003.
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Millennium Development Goals Campaign said “developed countries’ trade 
policy remains highly discriminatory against precisely those products in 
the poorest countries, especially agriculture and textiles . . . the North does 
not practice the free trade it preaches.”38 ! e Brazilian Minister said, “! e 
WTO runs the risk of irrelevance . . . this will be to no one’s benefi t and 
certainly not to the benefi t of developing countries.”39 Farm subsidies 
create dependency and deprivation. All WTO members who gave a state-
ment were listed on the WTO website, but the US is not listed – either 
because they did not give a statement or because they had their statement 
taken off  the public record. Lula was is concerned about US pressure on 
G22 countries.40
As we have stated, the developed world does not like the institutional 
arrangements in the WTO. ! ey much prefer the UN Security Council or 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank structures where infl u-
ence coincides roughly with a country’s Gross Domestic Product. While in 
New York last year, Lula compared international politics to labor negotia-
tions. He said that one worker alone is nothing, but with a union, workers 
can challenge the boss.41 
Since then, developing countries have begun to go on the off ensive. ! e 
Peace Clause, which prevented countries from bringing charges of unfair 
agriculture tariff s against other countries, has expired and India subsequently 
announced that they would impose a tax on any subsidized agricultural 
imports from the US and EU. ! e measure was said to be proposed some-
time after the Peace Clause ended.42 Brazil is also bringing similar charges 
to the WTO against the US.43
Small farming v. Agribusiness?
Michael Lind of the New America Foundation predicted that this new 
coalition would not last, but not because of US pressure. He wrote in 
the New York Times that the coalition “is bound to fray when it becomes 
clear that while the free traders are getting what they want out of the 
38) Agence France Presse, 10 Oct 2003b.
39) World Trade Organization, 11 Sept 2003.
40) Xinhua News Agency, 10 Oct 2003.
41) Henwood 2003.
42) Financial Times, 15 Oct 2003.
43) New York Times, 24 Jan 2004.
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relationship – lower taxes and expanded markets – the populism and envi-
ronmentalism of the left will be thwarted.”44 He agrees that subsidies ought 
to be reduced, but not because it will make room for the economies of the 
developing countries to grow, but because they exploit consumers and tax-
payers in the developed countries. He says the enrichment of peasant farm-
ers in developing nations is an unlikely result of farm subsidy reform. 
“Ending subsidies,” he continues, “if it leads to modernization of agricul-
ture in the developing world, is likely to destroy the very sorts of commu-
nities the pro-trade left seeks to support.” Lind is arguing that as they are 
replaced with agribusinesses, family farmers will become as rare in devel-
oping nations as they are in developed nations. ! is is analogous to what 
occurred in the United States after the invention of the cotton gin. ! e 
mechanization of cotton-picking created a mass migration of largely Black 
workers from the rural countryside of the South to the industrial cities of 
the North. In the developing world, however, there are not as many indus-
trial opportunities as there were in the US during the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Lind proposes two options: keep ineffi  cient small farmers or support 
a more effi  cient use of the land by converting to a modern agribusiness 
system and force many of the farmers off  of the land as they become 
replaced with machines.
But Doug Henwood pens in ! e Nation that the choices extend beyond 
traditional small farming v. huge multinational agribusinesses. We are able 
to develop technology and trade policies in such a way that we can have 
the best of both – the fairness and social egalitarianism of small farms and 
the effi  ciency of agribusinesses.45 We need to shift the focus from protect-
ing the job to protecting the worker. Protectionist policies that keep jobs 
in the US for example at the expense of jobs in, say Argentina, are not the 
solution. We need to develop something more sustainable for the future of 
multilateralism. Providing funds for re-training when economies shift pro-
tect workers better than expensive subsidies that keep jobs where they are. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the formation of the G22, the WTO, and 
have placed these in a context of global inequality. Future studies can help 
44) Lind 2003.
45) Henwood 2003.
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to refi ne and operationalize aspects of globalization theories. Globalization 
is creating cross-national ties among members of the Global South. ! e 
relationship between China, India, and Brazil developed into one not seen 
before within WTO negotiations.
! e fi ght for farm subsidy reform continues to be an uphill battle. It 
now largely resides in the domestic politics of the individual G4 countries. 
In the US, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) has been working to impose 
limits on farm subsidies for some time, but has met fi erce resistance. ! e 
issue is so contentious that a Texan cotton farmer accused the Senator of 
wanting to start a new Civil War.46 But the farm subsidy issue needs reform 
not just for international policy reasons, but for domestic policy as well. 
! e farm industry in the US has become so ineffi  cient and dependent on 
farm subsidies that they account for nearly one-half of the total net income 
for American farmers.47 Still the National Cotton Council of America 
(NCC) maintains that the law does not need to be changed. “It provides 
an adequate safety net in times of low prices.”48 ! e NCC naturally main-
tains such statements that are so contrary to the fact because any limits in 
farm subsidies will cut into their revenue. 
! e developed world seems to have been largely indiff erent to the poten-
tial progress of the developing world, should the subsidies be lifted. As the 
challenges of globalization continue to mount, the pressure for success 
within global institutions will rise and the issues of international security, 
environmental sustainability, disease control, and the global economy will 
only become more urgent. As we become a tighter knit global community, 
it is to our advantage to have a tighter knit global policy independent of 
the false divisions we have created.
! e case of the G22 provides insights into global social movement coali-
tions. Seeing the coalition of nation-states as a proxy for the global farmers 
movement helped to rally civil society actors at the Cancun talks. ! e coali-
tion also built upon the existing MERCOSUR trading bloc and expanded 
globally to developing countries with a similar agricultural interest.49 G22
46) ! e New York Times 10 Nov 2003.
47) Environmental Working Group.
48) National Cotton Council of America.
49) ! is structure was marshaled in a manner not dissimilar from the way in which Morris 
1986 discusses how the US civil rights movement used the already existing structure of the 
Church to aid in the mobilization of social movement participants.
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members had higher levels of democracy than non-G22 countries, sug-
gesting that countries exposed to democracy may be more likely to par-
ticipate in transnational coalition politics. G22 countries also were located 
in the semi-periphery. ! is is consistent with resource mobilization theory 
at an organizational level, where countries at the semi-periphery leverage 
their structural position to gain additional advantages.
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